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I. Introduction
Since Demsetz (1968) bid-ask spread is recognized as the price of liquidity provided by the dealers in an equity market. A number of studies have investigated what determines spread (Branch and Freed [1977] , McInish and Wood [1992] , Klock and McCormick [1999] , Heflin and Shaw [2000] ). Some of the significant determinants of spread found in the literature are order size, number of trades, competition in the dealers' market, ownership structure, and the native characteristics of a stock e.g., price, and volatility. Trading rules and mechanics of trading that proxy for information flow are also found to affect the spread.
There is very little empirical evidence on institutional trading and spread and their interrelationship. Keim and Madhavan (1997) find execution costs for institutional trades are different between listed and NASDAQ stocks. Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2001) report an asymmetric relation between institutional buys and sells and soft-dollar execution. However, there is some evidence of the effect of institutional trading on securities prices. Empirical studies using order size or trading volume as a proxy for institutional trading 1 suggest an increased price effect associated with institutional trading. Using proprietary data on institutional trading, Chan and Lakonishok (1993) find the average price effect to be small for institutional trades, but the price effect for buys and sells to be asymmetric; and Sias and Starks (1997) find that institutional trading contributes to serial correlation of returns.
The role of institutional trading in the determination of spread is interesting since it is often argued (casually) that increased institutional participation in the U.S. equity market during the past decade has led to an increase in the volatility, and has widened the bid-ask spread in the equity market. On the other hand, some argue that institutional trades provide liquidity, and hence decrease spread. Bertisimas and Lo (1998) show how optimal trading strategies may be devised by execution cost minimizing investment mangers. In any case, there is very little empirical evidence or theoretical knowledge to conclude how institutional trading affects spread. Further since spread is considered to be a sum of two different components, adverse selection, and order processing 2 it is unclear how institutional trading affects the individual components of the spread.
In this paper, we investigate if institutional trading has any information content
beyond what has been documented as a size or volume effect. In a multivariate, panel regression framework, we determine if there exists a relation between bid-ask spread and institutional trading after adjusting for size and price effects. Most studies on the determinants of spread focus on the supply side of dealership market i.e., competition in the dealer market, and use a cross sectional regression approach. Our approach is different from previous studies in two important ways. First, we focus on the demand side (investors' characteristics) to determine the relation between spread and institutional trading 3 ; and second, we use a panel data approach accounting specifically for both serial and contemporaneous correlation in the error terms 4 . We report regression results using 2 Arguably there is also inventory effect in spread. In this paper, we use a decomposition technique that ignores inventory effect. 3 Recently, some other papers have studied the demand side, particularly the ownership structure. For example, Heflin and Shaw (2000) document a relation between block holding and spread, and Chung and Charoenwong (1998) look at insider holding as a determinant of spread. 4 Dey (2000) introduces a similar but reduced form panel data regression model for effective spread.
both effective ($) and relative spread as the dependent variable in a set of regression equations.
Further we decompose the spread into order processing and adverse selection components and investigate how those components vary with changes in trading volume, net order flow (buy vs. sell), and institutional trading. We assume contemporaneous correlation between the disturbances and use an SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression)
analysis to find the significant determinants of the adverse selection and the order processing components of the spread for our sample firms. We use a unique data set (TORQ) that identifies institutional trading. Prior studies proxy institutional participation by using measures based on trade size that are subject to measurement error.
Our results show that institutional trading proportion is inversely related to both effective and relative spreads. We also find that the negative slope (suggestive of the inverse relation) is not constant and flattens out at higher concentrations of institutional trading. We find that this negative slope is provided by both institutional buys and sells alike. Results from a SUR analysis show that the adverse selection costs tend to increase and the order processing costs tend to decrease with increases in institutional trades.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, we present the motivation for this study. In section III, we describe an empirical model for spread using panel regressions, provide data description, and explain the results. Further, we describe the decomposition of the spread into order processing and adverse selection costs components and report results from a SUR analysis of the determinants of those components. Section IV concludes the paper.
II. Motivation

II.A. Relation between Spread and Institutional trading
Schwartz (1988) identifies four classes of variables, namely, activity, risk, information, and competition as determinants of spread. Existing literature find trade size, number of trades, ownership structure, and extent of market power in the dealership market to be the key determinants of bid-ask spread (McInish and Wood [1992] , Laux [1993, 1995] 
II.B. Components of the spread
We extend our analysis of the relation between institutional trading and spread by decomposing the spread into its order processing and adverse selection components and investigating the effect of institutional trading on the individual components. We use a technique from LSB (1995) to decompose the spread into order processing and adverse selection components and hypothesize a relation between the individual components and institutional trading. Sias (1996) reports positive correlation between institutional activity and market volatility; however, Cohen et al (1987) suggest that institutions trade frequently because of their low order processing costs. Bertisimas and Lo (1998) derive optimal trading strategies of institutions based on minimum execution cost. LSB (1995) find the order processing cost to be decreasing and adverse selection cost to be increasing in trade size.
We conjecture that if institutional trading is a mix of information and liquidity trading then the information effect should increase the adverse selection component and the liquidity effect should decrease the order processing costs. We also recognize that while gross volume is important for the determination of order processing cost, trade direction or net volume (buy volume -sell volume), is important in the determination of adverse selection costs. We therefore include log (buy/sell) as a variable in the regression model for the adverse selection component.
We determine through a set of simultaneous equations how institutional trading affects the order processing and the adverse selection components of the spread after 
III. Regression Models, Data Description, and Results
III.A.1. Panel Data Regression Model
We use a multivariate, panel (time series -cross sectional) regression framework to investigate the effect of institutional trading on the bid-ask spread. We use a unique data set (TORQ) that allows us to identify the order origination for a trade as institutional or otherwise. Most studies on the determinants of spread use pooled OLS estimates of the parameters of a regression model. OLS estimates ignore the covariance structure of the error term both across firms and over time.
We assume disturbances are both serially and contemporaneously correlated.
Specifically, we assume an AR(1) process with contemporaneous correlation for the disturbance term. In our model for the spread, the serial correlation may be due to lagged spread or lagged values of the independent variables or their interactions. Kim and Ogden (1996) find higher order serial correlation for the spread, and Peles (1992) report contemporaneous correlation among equity trading of institutional investors. Parks (1967) provide consistent and efficient estimates of the parameters when disturbances follow a first order auto regressive process -AR(1) with contemporaneous correlation.
We run the following regression model for our panel data:
where: n = 1…N; number of firms in sample, t = 1…T; number of trading days Spread nt = Effective or Relative spread for the nth firm on day t NtradePct nt = Number of trades on day t for firm n expressed as a proportion of average number of daily trades over the entire sample period Dly_Avg nt = Volume of trade on day t for firm n expressed as a proportion of average daily trading volume over the entire sample period Price nt = Closing price on day t for firm n Instprop nt = Institutional trading (number of trades) as a proportion of total trading for the nth firm on day t.
Further, the error structure is assumed as follows:
and , (due to contemporaneous correlation), ε ρ ε µ nt n n t nt
(cross correlation is zero).
III.A.2. Data
To estimate the parameters of our regression model, we use data from the TORQ data set. The TORQ files released by NYSE were prepared under the supervision of Professor Joel Hasbrouck during his tenure as a Visiting Economist to the NYSE. This dataset contains trades, quotes, order processing, and audit trail data for a sample of 144 NYSE stocks for the three months (63 trading days) from November 1990 through January 1991. 9 These firms represent a size stratified random sample of firms in the NYSE and thus cover the broad spectrum of NYSE firms.
As noted by Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) , the marginal contribution of TORQ data over ISSM or TAQ data is in providing identification for traders' classes, as institutions, individuals, and dealers. Most studies using other trades/quotes databases use size as a proxy for institutional trades.
We impose a restriction that is common among studies that study effective spreads or the components of the spread to ensure adequacy of data in estimation. We select all firms in the data set that have on average 20 trades per day or more during the sample period. Further, in classifying the trades, whenever there are executions of multiple orders on the active side of a trade, we take the trader class of the largest order 9 For more details on the TORQ database and on trading procedures at the NYSE, see Hasbrouck (1992) .
on the active side as the initiator of that trade. The active side of the trade is determined using the Lee-Ready (1991) algorithm. 10 This reduces our sample to 65 firms.
Of the 65 firms that survived our initial cutoff, 14 firms have one or more days of missing observations or days with trading halts. We leave out the firms with trading halt days from our study since the effect of trading halts on spreads and the price discovery process is unique and beyond the realm of this paper. We chose to omit the firms with missing observations, since there are questions about the reliability of estimates using an unbalanced panel 11 . Thus we have a balanced panel of 51 firms with 63 days data that we use in our panel regression.
The panel data set includes daily data for the firms in the data set. For each firm, we calculate the mean daily effective bid-ask spread, and the proportion of buy and sell orders initiated by institutions for each day. We compute the effective spread for each trade defined as twice the absolute value of the difference between trade price and the prevailing mid-quote. The mean effective spread is the average of effective spreads across all trades in a day. To determine the mean proportion of trades by institutions in that firm, we calculate, for each day, the proportion of trades by institutions on the buy and sell side.
Besides proportion of institutional trading, there are three other independent variables in the panel regression. The "number of trades" variable is computed as the number of trades each day divided by the average number of trades for the firm over the 10 Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) show the effectiveness of Lee-Ready algorithm for classifying trades into buys and sells. 11 We explored another alternative i.e., to consider all the firms (65) but for fewer days (61). However, there was a problem in deciding which 2 days to delete for firms that have full 63 days data. Since any choice on this was likely to be arbitrary, we chose to use a balanced panel of 51 firms over 63 days.
sample period. Thus this is a measure of abnormal trading in each day. Trading above (below) mean would give this variable a value higher (lower) than one. The "trading volume" variable is computed by dividing the daily share volume for the firm by the average daily share volume over the sample period. Therefore, this variable also has values above (below) one when trading volume is higher (lower) than the average daily share volume. The price variable is the closing price of the stock.
12
In Table 1 , we present means of the computed statistics of the variables used in the panel regression. We first compute the relevant statistics for the sample firms over the sample period and then compute the means of those statistics. Thus we report the means of the cross sections of firm means, medians, and standard deviations. The interfirm mean (median) spread is .126 (.12) that is about an eighth. The inter-firm mean standard deviation is quite low at .02. The largest spread in our sample is .514, approximately one-half, and the lowest .019 or approximately one-sixty-fourth. The inter-firm mean (and median) institutional trading in our sample is around 30%.
Although institutions generally trade on a regular basis, in some trading days there is no institutional trading. Of the 3,213 (51×63) firm trading days covered in our sample there were 10 firm-days when there was no institutional trading, and one firm-day when all the trading was initiated by institutions. There is also sufficient variability in the number of trades and volume. The low trading (volume) in our sample was 9% (3%) of average daily trades (volume). The high trading (volume) was 392% (1235%) of average daily volume. In Table 2 , we present Pearson correlations for variables in the regression. 12 Using average price over a day instead of closing price does not change the results.
Panel A presents pooled correlations computed from 3,213 observations. In Panel B, we present the means of correlations computed in time series for each firm. Table 3 This conjecture is confirmed with model 3.
III.A.3 Regression Results of Panel Model
In model 3, the institutional proportion variable is replaced by three variableshigh, medium and low proportion. The high (medium, low) proportion variable has the same value as institutional proportion if institutional trading proportion is in the top (middle, bottom) 33 percentile, and zero otherwise. The coefficients of all three variables are negative and significant in the regression, but while the coefficient for low proportion is -.0144, that for the high proportion is significantly (14%) less at -.0122. We interpret these results as follows. On average, there may be a mean positive effect on institutional trading embodied in the positive intercept. However, when there is an increase in institutional trading within a level, the spread declines, but the rate of decrease is lower at higher levels of institutional proportion. Between low and medium levels, the rate of decrease is similar indicating these are perhaps two discrete levels of institutional proportions.
Finally, for our fourth model, we break up the institutional proportion into institutional buy and institutional sell to test for a difference in their effect on the spread.
Results from the fourth model show that spread reduces as institutional trading increases, be it buy or sell. The coefficients for buy and sell are significantly negative for both effective spread and relative spread.
These results support our hypotheses. We show (H1) that institutional trading is a significant variable in the determination of both effective and relative spreads. We also show that this relation has a downward slope that gradually flattens out. Finally, we
show that institutional trading per se drives the relation between spread and institutional trading, and not the direction of institutional trade -buy or sell.
III.B.1 Decomposition of Spread
In order to test our third hypothesis, we decompose the quoted spread for the firms in our sample to determine the adverse selection and order processing components 13 . We follow a decomposition technique originally proposed by Stoll 
where, P t = log trade price at time t Q t = log quote mid point at time t ∆ = Change in the relative variable from t to t+1
e t+1 , u t+1 = Random error terms with zero mean and constant variance 13 We don't do any analysis with inventory holding cost component. 14 There are several decomposition methodologies other than Stoll (1989) that are available in the literature. Huang and Stoll (1997) , Glosten and Harris (1988) , and George, Kaul and Nirmalendran (1991) provide estimates of the different components of the spread including adverse selection, order processing and inventory holding cost. Studies using different methodologies find the components of the spread to be different. There is no consensus about any one of the methodologies being more robust than the others. The assumption about zero correlation between the error terms is based on the reported findings in LSB (1995). Table 4 reports descriptive statistics about the spread decomposition for the 65 firms in the sample. We find that the order processing costs for our sample firms are higher, and adverse selection costs lower than that reported in LSB 1995. The means and medians of the components are similar indicating a symmetric (low skewness) distribution for the component costs. Not surprisingly the descriptive statistics from our sample correspond closely with those from the largest volume sub-sample in LSB (1995) confirming the notion that institutions generally trade in large sizes and in high volume, liquid stocks.
III.B.2. SUR model
We use a cross sectional SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) model to estimate the parameters of the following system of equations for the adverse selection and the order processing components of the daily spread for our sample firms. Table 5 
III.B.3. Results of the SUR model
IV. Conclusion
The role of institutional trading in the determination of spread is of interest to regulators and market makers. It is often argued that institutional investors have superior information, better processing power to assimilate the information, and greater access to All regression models in Table 3 above are run with a panel data set that has 51 firms each with 63 trading days. The Parks (1967) method with AR(1) and contemporaneously correlated error term is used for estimation. 
